STUDY QUESTION: Can traceability of gametes and embryos be ensured during IVF?
associated process steps and 41.9 (SD ± 12.4) possible failure modes were recognized per centre. A RPN ≥15 was calculated in a mean of 6.4 steps (range 2-12, SD ± 3.60). A total of 293 failure modes were centrally analysed 45 of which were considered at medium/high risk. After consistent corrective measures implementation and re-evaluation, a significant reduction in the RPNs in all centres (RPN <15 for all steps) was observed. A simple and comprehensive traceability system was designed as the result of the seven FMEA analyses.
Introduction
To minimize the risk of error during manipulation of oocytes, sperms and embryos an effective and accurate traceability system is essential. As recommended by international guidelines and Directives (Commission Directive, 2004; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 2014 ; ESHRE Guideline Group on Good Practice in IVF Labs, 2016) a robust protocol of patient and cell identification involving also witnessing is required in all IVF units. Witnessing of susceptible steps by a second operator is the main control measure used worldwide to mitigate the risk of mix-up. However, inevitably this process is potentially exposed to human errors. Unfortunately, different mistakes have been in fact reported with dramatic consequences for both patients and health care professionals (Liebler, 2002; Spriggs, 2003; Bender, 2006 Due to the possible risk of mix-up in IVF, electronic witnessing systems have been introduced and are generally recommended (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 2014) . These systems are however expensive and require an extensive validation. The majority of the centres worldwide still use thus only human approaches.
To identify real or potential failures in the manual witnessing based traceability process and to plan changes in practices to reduce the risk of mistake occurring a multicentre failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) was performed.
Materials and Methods

Study design
This is a multicentre study designed by the Italian Society of Embryology Reproduction and Research (SIERR) in collaboration with the Italian National Transplant Centre (CNT, Italian National Institute of Health, Rome, Italy). Seven representative Italian IVF centres were included in the study. The centres were selected according to their workload, location and type (public or private). Characteristics of the centres are described in Table I .
The study had a total duration of 21 months, from April 2015 to December 2016 and was centrally coordinated by a risk analysis specialist, an expert embryologist and a specialist in human factor.
The goal of these experts was to bring a better understanding of how IVF professionals interact with procedures and technologies to ensure traceability in IVF from different point of view including problematic patterns of behaviour (related to stress, work overload and team-working).
In the first session, the three experts instructed all principal investigators about proactive risk assessment and FMEA methodology. In each centre, an independent multidisciplinary working group was then formed. The specialist in risk assessment guided the groups during the different FMEA sessions.
Forming the teams
The teams consisted of at least seven members including, for each centre, different professionals all considered to be key persons involved in the traceability process:
The external risk management specialist leaded the teams and ensured that the FMEA sessions were performed accurately. The involvement of all members of the teams with their respective work experience was insisted on. The goal was to obtain a complete vision of the traceability systems from different points of view. The presence of an external specialist enabled a controlled comparison between the different protocols to be performed.
Mapping the traceability process
Each group designed a flow diagram of their traceability process from gamete procurement to final disposition, including cryopreservation. Each process phase was clearly described and responsibilities identified. Oocyte and sperm donation, import/export of gametes and embryos and pre-implantation genetic testing were excluded from the analysis.
Performing FMEA analysis
Each FMEA team accurately reviewed their traceability protocol and for each process phase the number of process steps was calculated. Potential failure modes were then recognized. When identified, a comprehensive discussion involving all members of the teams and moderated by the expert was made. According to the Joint Commission International (2002, 2010) , for each failure a risk priority number (RPN) score was calculated by multiplying the probability of occurrence (O), severity of impact on the process (S) and chance of detection (D) (RPN = O × S × D). The scoring system used was defined by the team and is described in Table II . Each score was evaluated and agreed by the entire team. A RPN between 1 and 15 was considered a low risk of failure, between 15 and 50 a moderate risk and ≥50 a high risk of failure. The analysis of the seven different FMEA results was performed centrally, and focused on finding the common reasons of failure and suggesting corrective actions that could fit in every unit. A second FMEA analysis was performed in each centre to assess the efficacy of the corrective measures implemented. Finally, a general traceability system based on the different FMEA analyses performed and compatible with every centre independently from it characteristics was designed.
Results
The IVF teams identified seven main process phases: oocyte collection, sperm collection (ejaculated and/or surgical sperm extraction), gamete processing (sperm preparation, oocyte preparation and/or denudation prior to insemination), insemination (standard IVF and/or ICSI), embryo culture (incubation of oocyte/embryo in a culture dish and media refresh), embryo transfer and cryopreservation (vitrification/freezing and warming/thawing). The seven FMEAs were cumulated and the mean values (±SD) per centre of process steps, failures modes and high/moderate risk modes were calculated (Table III) . A total of 293 failure modes were described (41.9 ± 12.46 per centre) 45 of which (6.4 ± 3.60 per centre) with a RPN ≥15. All phases were potentially exposed to errors in the traceability process; the most important are represented in Fig. 1 .
First, a potential risk of oocyte mix-up at egg retrieval was identified due to incomplete labelling protocol. In four centres, tubes/dishes utilized for follicular fluid collection and/or thermoblocks involved in tube transportation were not correctly labelled and/or witnessing process was not planned before, during and/or after the procedure. If unlabelled tubes were left in the operating theatre or in the thermoblocks, these could be attributed to the next patient generating a mixup. This risk was calculated to have at highest a RPN = 30 with a high severity = 5, a low occurrence = 2 and a difficult detection = 3.
Patient identification at sperm collection was vulnerable in four centres with at highest a RPN = 20 (severity = 5, occurrence = 2 and detection = 2). This susceptibility was mainly due to the involvement of different professionals (including nurses, administration and volunteers) not always correctly trained for patient identification and pot labelling. However, it was generally reported that the occurrence of patient's misidentification that could end up in a sperm mix-up was very rare due to the unequivocal awareness of all operators, and the relatively high probability of detection by the embryologist by crosschecking files.
Incomplete labelling was also identified during gamete processing and in particular at oocyte denudation. Tubes and dishes used for removing cumulus corona cells from the oocytes (denudation kit) were not always correctly labelled (five centres). Although the procedure was normally performed by a single operator, and ended up with the positioning of the oocytes in a labelled dish for culture or incubation, a distraction or interruption of the work could generate a mix-up (kit exchange). No witnessing was generally planned for this phase. The calculated highest RPN was thus very high = 75: severity = 5, occurrence = 3 and detection = 5.
In different phases (insemination, embryo culture, embryo transfer, cryopreservation) the major source of error was related to cell labelling.
When handwriting is used (five centres) the probability to make a mistake when reporting data on the dishes/tubes is relatively common (occurrence = 3), the detection high (= 2) and the severity lower (= 4) because involving loss of material instead of mismatch. At cryopreservation this risk is increased because not only cells must be correctly identified but also the correct positioning in the cryocontainer. In this case the RPN was = 36 with a severity = 4, an occurrence = 3 and a detection = 3.
Finally, a mix-up is possible if during embryo culture or embryo preparation for transfer a failure in cell identification occurs due to distraction and/or work overload in absence of a witness (RPN = 25: severity = 5, occurrence = 1 and detection = 5).
The principal potential sources of failure at every phase were thus: patient and/or cell identification, labelling and witnessing process. These were reviewed by principal investigators and experts and clearly defined as follows:
Patient identification: It was established that patient involvement was crucial and active identification essential. This is performed by asking to the patient to give his/her own identity and not by reading out to him/her the information. Patient's data requested include at least name, surname and date of birth and are crosschecked against an appropriated identity document (preferably with picture) and hospital records. A further involvement of the patient was recommended; once the identification has been performed and confirmed, the patient should be asked to check and sign the corresponding label containing both partners' data. The process must be attested and recorded by the operator. After the first identification, the experts acknowledged that different carriers (such as bracelets or cards) holding the signed label could be used for the successive identification steps. In this case the patient must carry these and present them during all phases of the treatment including in the operating theatre. The alternative is for active identification to be repeated at each step of the treatment where patients are involved. The operator performing the identification (if not part of the laboratory staff) can communicate to the IVF lab in different forms, including internal phones. Also in this case, the experts underlined the necessity to perform an active communication of patient data and to have a clear protocol for double-checking of the information that must be attested and recorded by the laboratory staff.
Labelling:
The experts recognized handwriting labelling as an elevated potential source of error. Illegibility or imperfect spelling was a common source of failure in the traceability systems. Printed labels are thus recommended together with a clear protocol for labels generation including double-check of reported information. Labels must be indelible, resistant to humidity and when appropriate also to liquid nitrogen and must contain both partners' names, surnames, date of birth and/or the unique identification number generated by the hospital and reported in all patients records. All supplies (tubes, dishes, multiwells, straws and vials) are labelled before use. Labels are counted and the number of labels used against supplies consumed is verified at the end of each procedure.
Cell identification: Every supply containing reproductive cells (sperms, oocytes, embryos) must be clearly labelled. This includes: tubes containing follicular fluid at oocyte retrieval, sperm plot, dishes, multiwells and tubes containing oocytes, sperms during preparation, inseminating dishes or tubes, denuding kit, embryo transfer dish, cryopreservation kit and cryo-containers (straws and vials). Before moving cells from one supply to the other the labels are crosschecked.
Witnessing process: Witnessing is necessary at every critical step. This process involves a second operator who verifies that critical laboratory procedures are done correctly. Although it is generally recommended to perform the witnessing at the time the process takes place, the experts recognized a high degree of difficulty to perform such assessment contemporaneously to each procedure. Two different witnessing processes were thus defined and implemented, called respectively 'double check' and 'final check'. Double check: This approach is used to prevent irreversible adverse events before they occur. In this case the operator calls the witness before performing the procedure. The witness follows the whole procedure and certifies that patients and cells have been correctly identified and matched.
Final check: This approach is used to intercept adverse events that can be reversible. The operator calls the witness only at the end of the procedure. The witness performs a complete check of all the steps executed during the process phase. This approach can be applied only in those phases where the witness is able to reverse the mistake once detected, before it can generate a mix-up. If at final check, a mistake on patient, oocyte/sperm and/or embryo assignment is discovered, the following procedures are interrupted until the problem is solved. To be able to reverse the mistake it is important that nothing is discarded before the witness performs the final check.
All witnessing procedures are recorded in patient's file (including date and time, procedure witnessed and signature of both operator and witness). In turn, embryologist cannot work alone when critical phases are carried out. When database is used a double check of the transferred information from written data to electronic records must be also performed.
Witnessing involves different professionals at different time points of the IVF procedure. The most appropriate person to perform witnessing is the embryologist who is directly involved in the critical procedures that may generate a mismatch. Other persons such as nurses, clinicians, administration (or even volunteers) and patients themselves are also involved in the traceability system as witnesses. To ensure that all persons involved in the process are clearly informed about the importance and the responsibility related to witnessing, a clear traceability protocol is planned coupled with a precise training programme. Competency is maintained through regular training to update staff.
Re-evaluating FMEA after the implementation of corrective measures
Laboratory directors conducted re-evaluations of the FMEA after the implementation of the corrective measures suggested in patient identification, cell identification, labelling and witnessing process. None of the medium/high risk steps in the revised FMEA had an RPN ≥15 (Table III) confirming that the actions introduced were successful in reducing potential risks of mismatches. Moreover, all low risk steps were eliminated due to the improvements in the traceability systems.
Mapping a general traceability system
A flow diagram was generated as the result of the seven FMEAs performed in the different centres and according to the measurers defined (Fig. 2) . As a general fundamental rule only one procedure can be done at the time by an operator and/or in the same stationing of the laminar flow. In particular for each phase the following instructions were defined:
Phase 1: oocyte collection Patient identification, as previously defined, is performed in the operating theatre. Patient identity cannot be ascertained by any other practice (i.e. following the operation list). It is recommended that laboratory staff directly perform patient identification. As an alternative (if the laboratory is not in communication with the operating theatre) patient identity can be transmitted to the lab using validated procedures (i.e. internal phones and double-check). The operator performing patient identification is charged with labelling. In the operating theatre, all follicular fluid tubes are labelled. In the Lab all supplies, including dishes for follicular fluid screening and tubes, dishes and multiwells used for oocyte washing and culture are also marked. At the end of the procedure the witness performs the final check that includes: (i) crosscheck of patient identity against laboratory records (including electronic ones) and labels information present on all tubes/dishes or multiwells used during the oocyte retrieval procedure; (ii) crosscheck of the number of labels used against supplies consumed and (iii) verification that all materials and supplies used are either discarded (including tubes in the operating theatre) or correctly incubated. A checklist of witnessing actions in this phase is recommended.
Phase 2: sperm collection
Patient identification is performed before sperm collection. The signed label is immediately applied on the sperm pot and this latter is given to the patient directly in the collection room. In case of surgical sperm retrieval, patient identification is performed in the operating theatre. Patient identity cannot be ascertained by any other practice (i.e. following the operation list). It is recommended that laboratory staff directly perform patient identification. As an alternative (if the laboratory is not in communication with the operating theatre) patient identity is transmitted to the lab using validated procedures (i.e. internal phones and double-check). The operator performing patient identification is charged with labelling. All supplies containing epididymal or testicular tissue are labelled in the operating theatre. At the end of the procedure the witness performs the final check that includes: (i) crosscheck of patient identity against laboratory records (including electronic ones) and labels information reported on sperm pot and/or on all tubes/dishes used during the surgical sperm retrieval procedure; (ii) crosscheck of the number of labels used against supplies consumed and (iii) verification that all materials and supplies used are either discarded (including tubes/dishes in the operating theatre) or correctly incubated. A checklist of witnessing actions in this phase is recommended.
Phase 3: gamete processing
The operator controls the correspondence between patient records and labels information. All dishes/tubes and multiwells for sperm and oocyte preparation, including denudation, are pre-labelled. The operator controls the correspondence between the labels during each critical step of the procedure; each time cells are moved from one container to another. At final check, the witness crosschecks the labels information against laboratory records (including electronic ones) and verifies that all materials and supplies used are either discarded or correctly incubated.
Phase 4: insemination
The operator controls the correspondence between patient records and labels information. All tubes, dishes/multiwells used for insemination are pre-labelled (including injection dish for ICSI). Before standard IVF or ICSI dish is prepared by adding sperm and oocytes, the witness crosschecks labels information on all supplies against laboratory records (including electronic ones). The witness follows the procedure.
Phase 5: embryo culture
The operator controls the correspondence between patient records and labels information. All dishes/multiwells for embryo culture are prelabelled. The operator controls the correspondence between labels each time embryos are moved from one container to another. At final check, the witness crosschecks labels information reported on all dishes/multiwells used during the procedure and verifies that all materials and supplies used are either discarded or correctly incubated.
Phase 6: embryo transfer
Patient identification is performed in the embryo transfer room. It is recommended that laboratory staff directly perform patient identification. Before the procedure commences the witness performs the double check crosschecking patient identity against laboratory records (including electronic ones) and label information reported on the embryo transfer dish, verifies that the correct number and the correct embryo(s) are positioned in the transfer dish or dedicated to further culture or cryopreservation and verifies that all materials and supplies used are either discarded or correctly incubated. The witness follows the embryo transfer procedure.
Phase 7: cryopreservation (a) at vitrification/freezing the operator controls the correspondence between patient records and labels information. All dishes/tubes/ multiwells/vials/straws prepared for sperm, oocyte and embryo vitrification/freezing are pre-labelled. The operator controls the correspondence between the labels during each critical step of the procedure; each time cells are moved from one container to another. At final check, the witness crosschecks the labels information against laboratory records (including electronic ones) and verifies that all materials and supplies used are either discarded or correctly located in the tank as indicated in the patients file. (b) at warming the operator controls the correspondence between patient records and cryo-container position in the tank. All supplies prepared for sperm, oocyte or embryo warming/thawing are pre-labelled. Before the procedure taking place the witness performs the double check crosschecking patient records (including electronic ones) and labels information reported on the materials prepared. The witness follows the first steps of the procedure including removal of straws/vials from the tank, labels information on supplies and disposition of gametes or embryos in the culture dish/tube/multiwell.
Moreover, operator should ensure the cleaning of work surfaces after each process phase in presence of the witness. This procedure must be included in witnessing checklist.
Discussion
In this study we report a multicentre FMEA analysis performed in seven representatives IVF centres in Italy. By analysing the traceability protocols in use in different settings the major potential failures associated with patient and cell identification have been identified. Interestingly, all process phases of an IVF cycle were potentially vulnerable. Although the risk of mismatch was estimated to be low, this study clearly underlines the importance of performing a proactive risk analysis of traceability protocols to identify those procedures potentially subjected to mistakes and plan corrective actions before an error can occurs. A group of experts was charged to centrally review the 293 failure modes described in the FMEAs. The analysis focused on those potential mistakes with the higher RPN that were found in two or more centres.
The first susceptible process analysed was the patient identification process associated with use of the operating list. This list was found to be, in different settings, a potential source of error. The list was in fact generated from software by different components of the team (i.e. nurses, gynaecologist, embryologist) in different moments. In turn, there was a high risk of inconsistency. Only active patient identification directly in the operating theatre, embryo transfer and sperm collection rooms was thus considered safe.
Human witnessing was also considered vulnerable. Relying on human may involve different risk namely: incomplete crosscheck, involuntary automaticity, non-contemporaneous checking and control omission, (Toft and Mascie-Taylor, 2005; Shebl et al., 2012; De Los Santos et al., 2013; Rienzi et al., 2015; Cimadomo et al., 2016) . The experts planned different corrective measures to minimize these dangers: checklist for complex witnessing processes, clear definition of timing of witnessing actions (contemporaneously or at the end of the procedure). Reducing the number of contemporaneous witnessing only to specific critical irreversible situations was believed to minimize the workload and thus the risk of omission. Final checks of the process phases can better be planned and agreed between operators. It is important to underline that automated systems of traceability have Figure 2 Flow diagram of a general traceability and witnessing protocol. Double check: refers to the witnessing process that is performed at the time process phase is performed. Final check: refers to the witnessing process that is performed at the end of the process phase.
been developed based on barcode labels (Schnauffer et al., 2005) or on Radio Frequency Identification technology (RFID) (Glew et al., 2006; Thornhill et al., 2011) and are strongly advisable if affordable.
Handwriting labelling was also identified as an important source of mistake. The use of printed labels that can enclose more information and those of both partners' was considered an important corrective measure in all centres. This approach also allows crosschecking the number of labels consumed against the number of supplies used, increasing the control efficacy. Interestingly in different centres some supplies used for screening or washing were not labelled at all. These included follicular fluid tubes, dishes for follicular fluid screening and denudation washing dishes, cryopreservation dishes. The FMEA approach clearly underlined the importance of labelling, including all steps of the procedures, without exceptions.
The team shared the idea that every single mistake in traceability has potentially dramatic effect on patients and treatment outcomes even if it does not result in a mix-up. A partial loss of the available reproductive cells due to miss assignment can in fact significantly impact reproductive chances.
In conclusion, our study has presented a comprehensive overview of the main phases of the IVF process, assessing the potential associated risks of mismatches and promoting consistent corrective actions that can help to prevent adverse event occurrence. Furthermore, a general traceability system is reported that can be potentially used in different settings. It is important to underline that our study was only focused on mismatch risk; however, centres should also ensure that information on relevant data related to products and materials coming into contact with the cells are also recorded (Commission Directives, 2004/23/EC; 2006/86/EC) . Another limitation of the study was that some phases of the IVF cycle were not included because not performed in all centres, and in particular gamete and embryo donation and pre-implantation genetic testing. A follow-up study is needed to confirm these data in a prospective way and to extend the analysis to new vulnerable steps.
We finally confirm that performing a risk analysis reinforce knowledge and consciousness on witnessing procedures and is advisable in all IVF centres to enhance safety.
